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Abstract. Income redistribution is the transfer of income from some individuals
to others directly or indirectly by means of social mechanisms, such as taxation,
public services and so on. Employing a spatial public goods game, we study the
influence of income redistribution on the evolution of cooperation. Two kinds of
evolutionary models are constructed, which describe local and global redistribution
of income respectively. In the local model, players have to pay part of their income
after each PGG and the accumulated income is redistributed to the members. While
in the global model, all the players pay part of their income after engaging in all
the local PGGs, which are centered on himself and his nearest neighbours, and the
accumulated income is redistributed to the whole population. We show that the
cooperation prospers significantly with increasing income expenditure proportion in
the local redistribution of income, while in the global model the situation is opposite.
Furthermore, the cooperation drops dramatically from the maximum curvature point
of income expenditure proportion. In particular, the intermediate critical points are
closely related to the renormalized enhancement factors.
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1. Introduction
The stability of most complex systems, ranging from human societies to animal
kingdoms, relies on public goods that individuals collected. The most precise technical
definition of a public good by Samuelson is a good that can be consumed by an additional
consumer without additional cost[1]. However, in the consciousness of most people, the
term conjures the image of a good available for all citizens to consume, such as national
defense, environmental protection, health insurance and highways[2]. Most governments
devote considerable resources to the provision of private goods, and such universal
provision schemes can redistribute income from the rich to the poor[3]. Redistribution of
income may provide a nonexcludable benefit to those who give, and many such schemes
are universal in the sense that everyone is eligible and the provision is free[4]. One of
the classic forms of income redistribution is the tax system, in which people are taxed
at fixed rates. People who make more money pay higher taxes, thereby forfeiting more
of their income to the government. Tax funds are used to benefit the society as a whole
by providing a variety of public and social services by the government, and the direct
transfer of income may occur in the case of welfare payments and other forms of cash
assistance made to low-income members of society.
Although natural selection favours the fittest and most successful individuals, which
in turn implies an innate selfishness that greatly challenges the concept of cooperation,
economic impact on the evolution of cooperation in human societies may just be the
missing ingredient for cooperative behaviour to prevail[5]. As the theoretical foundation
in this realm, evolutionary game theory has become one of the most frequently-used
approaches to understand how cooperation prevails in social-economic systems[6, 7].
Such kinds of systems in which successful strategies spread by imitation or genetic
reproduction are routinely analyzed in evolutionary biology, sociology, anthropology
and economics. Recently, the application of methods from statistical physics to these
systems has led to many important insights. It is known that public goods game (PGG)
is one of the most famous paradigms in evolutionary game theory, which is played
by groups and often used for discussing the conflict between individuals and common
interests[8]. In a typical PGG, n players are asked to decide whether or not to contribute
to a common pool. They are clear that the total amount of investments will be multiplied
by an enhancement factor r(r > 1) and then be distributed equally to all the players
irrespective of their contributions. Apparently, players who do not contribute fare better
than contributors of the group. Consequently, the whole system may evolve towards the
“tragedy of the commons”[9].
The emergence of cooperation in sizable groups between unrelated individuals
puzzles diverse fields of social sciences[10]. Many mechanisms have been proposed to
elucidate the prosperity of cooperative behaviours under the exploitation of defectors in
PGG, such as voluntary[11], punishment[12, 13, 14], social diversity[15], heterogeneous
wealth distribution[16], diverse contribution[17], Matthew effect[18], coevolution[19, 20]
and interdependent networks[21, 22]. However, it is known that human altruism goes
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far beyond that which has been observed in the animal world[23]. In the social-economic
system, it is generally agreed that giving is motivated by a variety of factors other than
altruism[24]. Few of previous researches on physical models has considered how specific
factors, such as redistribution of income, influence the evolution of cooperation in the
complex social-economic system.
Inspired by the seminal works, we consider diverse levels of redistribution of income
in the spatial PGG. Concretely, the effects of local and global redistribution of income
on the evolution of cooperation are studied respectively in this work. Basically, we
assume that each player engages in the local PGGs, which are centered on himself
and nearest neighbours to obtain their local income. Based on this, in the model of
local redistribution of income, players have to pay part of their idealized income to
the focal group according to a given income expenditure proportion after each round.
Distinguished from the contribution action during the PGG process, such compulsory
payment is named as the second-order payment. Subsequently, the accumulated income
are redistributed to all the members of this group regardless of their strategies and the
quantity of their second-order payments. On the other hand, in the global redistribution
of income, players pay part of their idealized income to the whole population. Similarly,
the accumulated income is then redistributed to all the players in the whole population.
However, the two types of redistribution models are essentially different in our work,
which play different roles in different stages in spatial PGG. In reality, the local
redistribution of income seems like a special transaction tax in economic system, which
is collected according to the definite quantity of the volume of trade. And then, the
revenue is redistributed to the group members uniformly, which amounts to the fiscal
subsidy for a particular industry. While in the global redistribution of income, the
processes of second-order payment and income redistribution can be classified as the
process of collecting and redistributing the gross income of personal income tax for
the whole population. Apparently, the processes of collection and redistribution have
essential differences between two types of income redistribution models. Remarkably,
we find that the evolution of cooperation in spatial PGG is significantly promoted
with the increasing income expenditure proportion of the whole population in local
redistribution of income. While in global redistribution of income, the evolutionary
trends of cooperation is opposite. Meanwhile, there exists a intermediate critical point
of income expenditure proportion for each fixed renormalized enhancement factor, where
cooperative behaviours drop dramatically.
2. Spatial PGG with local redistribution of income
We employ one L×L square lattice with periodic boundary condition and von Neumman
neighbourhood, where each player is surrounded byM = 4 local nearest neighbours and
the group size of each PGG is G = M + 1. There are no empty sites on the lattice,
and each player engages in G local PGGs which are centered on himself and the nearest
neighbours. It is noted that the square lattice is the simplest network that allows us to
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go beyond the well-mixed population assumption and take into account the interactions
engaged in group interactions among players rather than random[5]. Also, it allows us to
investigate the effects of redistribution of income on the evolution of cooperation more
detailed without the influence of heterogeneity. Initially, players are designed either as a
cooperator or a defector with equal probability. Without loss of generality, cooperators
contribute 1 to the common pool and defectors contribute nothing in each PGG. The
total contribution is subsequently multiplied by an enhancement factor r, and then
equally distributed to the G members in the same group irrespective of their strategies.
Consequently, the income of defectors engaging in one PGG is Πd = r · nc/G = η · nc,
and the corresponding income of cooperators Πc = Πd − 1, where nc is the number of
cooperators in the group and η = r/G denotes the renormalized enhancement factor in
each PGG.
After game interaction, each player has to pay part of their income to the group
according to the given income expenditure proportion plr. We emphasize that parameter
plr denotes the proportion of the income obtained in the single PGG of the focal
group. Subsequently, the accumulated income expenditure of players in this group
is redistributed to the G group members irrespective of their strategies and the amount
of their second-order payments. Thus, the actual income of each player in this group
after local redistribution of income is
Π′li = Πli · (1− plr) + SlG/G, (1)
where Πli denotes the income of a player after one PGG, SlG = plr·
∑G
li=1Πli is the
sum of the accumulated second-order payments of the group members. We assume
that, when a single public good is provided at positive levels by private individuals,
its provision is free and unaffected by a redistribution of income[25]. In addition, we
assume that the redistribution process is no cost and the player pays nothing to the
group if his income Πli is not positive after the corresponding PGG. After engaging in
all the groups centered on himself and nearest neighbours, a player obtains the final
payoff Πl =
∑G
li=1Π
′
li. Subsequently, each player is allowed to learn from one randomly
selected nearest neighbour. To be specific, player x adopts the strategy of the random
neighbour y with a probability determined by the difference of their final payoffs
W(x←y) =
1
1 + exp[(Πx −Πy)/κ]
, (2)
where κ denotes the selection intensity in strategy update process. Following a previous
study[26], we simply set κ = 0.5 in this work and mainly focus on the effects of
income redistribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial PGG. Also in this
work, we adopt the synchronous Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) procedure to update
the strategies of players. In addition, we employ the square lattice having L = 100
linear size to avoid finite size effects. Unless otherwise stated, all the simulation results
shown in this section are required up to 104 generations and then sampled by another
103 generations. The results of fractions of cooperators are averaged over 50 different
realizations of initial conditions.
Effects of income redistribution on the evolution of cooperation 5
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 
 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 C
oo
pe
ra
tio
n
 plr = 0
 plr = 0.3
 plr = 0.5
 plr = 0.7
 plr = 1.0
Figure 1. The evolution of cooperation in spatial PGG with local redistribution of
income as a function of η with different values of plr.
In the following, we present the simulation results of the effect of local income
redistribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial PGG. We first show the
evolution of the cooperative behaviours of the whole population as a function of the
renormalized enhancement factor η with different values of plr in Figure 1. As shown
in Figure 1, the evolution of cooperation on square lattice prospers dramatically with
the increment of the income expenditure proportion plr, which helps the cooperative
behaviours prevail under much worse conditions. In particular, with the increment of plr
until plr = 1.0, the survivability of cooperators on square lattice is enhanced steadily, and
the whole population can easily achieve the full cooperation even at η = 0.35. It is well-
known that, in the context of PGG, small values of enhancement factor favour defectors
and large values benefit cooperators[27]. In our work, compared with the frequencies of
cooperation on plr = 0, cooperators have a much better chance for survival when plr > 0.
Qualitatively, after each PGG in a group, the income of each defector is Πld and the
corresponding income of each cooperator is Πlc, where Πld − Πlc = 1. Subsequently,
after paying part of their income to the group according to the given probability plr, the
rest income of each defector is Π′ld = Πld · (1− plr), and Π
′
lc = Πlc · (1− plr) for the rest
income of each cooperator. Then, the accumulated income is redistributed to the group
members irrespective of their strategies and contributions. Accordingly, the final payoff
of each defector in this group is Π′′ld = Π
′
ld + SlG/G, and Π
′′
lc = Π
′
lc + SlG/G for the final
payoff of each cooperator. Consequently, the payoff difference between a cooperator
and defector in one group is Π′′ld − Π
′′
lc = Π
′
ld − Π
′
lc = (Πld − Πlc) · (1 − plr) = 1 − plr.
Thus, the payoff gap between cooperators and defectors is decreased with increasing
plr. That is, the mechanism of local redistribution of income narrows the wealth gap
between cooperators and defectors, which makes the cooperation behaviours have more
chance to prevail in the spatial PGG rather than without such mechanism. Moreover,
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Figure 2. Time evolution as characterized by the global density of cooperators with
different values of plr. Initially, cooperators and defectors are randomly distributed
on the square lattice with equal probability. The results are shown for η = 0.7. The
evolutionary processes are averaged over 1000 different initial conditions.
it is worth noting that each player engages in G local PGGs which are centered on
himself and nearest neighbours. Local redistribution of income further balances the
income difference of defectors and cooperators in one group. Suffered as a consequence,
the final payoff of each player on the square lattice is strongly dependent on the quality
of the groups around[28]. Obviously, more cooperators make larger contributions in
the group with a fixed number of participants. Thereinto, a player surrounded by the
groups with more cooperators has a competitive advantage over the neighbour players
around. Thus, the redistribution of income, which acts as a driving force for promoting
cooperation on the square lattice, gives prominence to the role of groups on the evolution
of cooperation and leads to persistent of full cooperation state over a wide range of
parameter plr[29, 30].
To investigate how the local redistribution of income affects the evolution of
cooperation in spatial PGG intuitively, we present the time evolution of cooperation
in Figure 2. Compared with the classical result, where plr = 0, the time evolution of
cooperation level prospers steadily with increasing plr. It is known that cooperators
can form compact clusters to prevent the invasion of defectors on square lattice[31].
These compact clusters help cooperators acquire an evolutionary advantage and thrive
gradually until reaching the steady states. While in our model, there implies a
propagation mechanism of evolutionary advantage for cooperation due to the local
redistribution of income. On one hand, the evolutionary advantage of defectors over
cooperators decreases by reducing the income disparity between them with increasing
plr. Consequently, the motivation of learning for cooperators from defectors diminishes
gradually. On the other hand, players within the groups of more cooperators has
evolutionary advantage over the others. In particular, in the context of plr → 1, there
is almost no payoff difference between cooperators and defectors within one group after
the redistribution of income. The only difference of performance exists among groups.
More cooperators make more benefits in one PGG, which help the group members obtain
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more after the redistribution of income. A player in the group with less cooperators
inclines to adopt the strategy of a random neighbour within the group including more
cooperators spontaneously[32]. Hence, the group including more cooperators enjoys the
evolutionary advantage of cooperation, and makes the cooperative behaviours spread
more rapidly on the square lattice with increasing plr. From another point of view, the
mechanism of local redistribution of income amplifies the differences between groups,
which increases the heterogeneity on the square lattice and boosts the evolution of
cooperation for the entire range of plr[33]. Thus, the redistribution of income directly
affects the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on the square lattice, which helps
cooperators reproduce and survive much better, even in the harsh environment.
3. Spatial PGG with global redistribution of income
In this section, we describe the evolution of cooperation in spatial PGG with global
redistribution of income in detail. Similarly with the former evolutionary model with
local redistribution of income, L×L square lattice with periodic boundary condition and
von Neumman neighbourhood is employed, where no empty sites are allowed. Players
also engage in G local PGGs which are centered on himself and nearest neighbours
to gain their income. Nevertheless, the process of income redistribution performs after
completing the G PGGs. Therein, players are mandatory to pay the part of their income
to the whole population according to a fixed probability pgr, which is also named as the
second-order payment as mentioned before. We emphasize that pgr denotes the income
expenditure proportion of all the income player obtained in the G PGGs. Subsequently,
the accumulated income is redistributed to all the players irrespective of their strategies
or the quantity of their second-order payments. Thus, the final payoff of each player on
the lattice is
Π′gi = Πgi · (1− pgr) + SgG/(L×L), (3)
where Πgi denotes the income of a player after G PGGs, SgG = pgr·
∑L×L
gi=1Πgi the
accumulated second-order payments of all the players, Π′gi the final payoff of a player
after the global redistribution of income. Also, the redistributing process is no cost
and the players pay nothing to whole population if Πgi is not positive after G PGGs.
Similarly, we employ Equation (2) and set κ = 0.5 in the update process. We also adopt
L = 100 linear size to avoid finite size effects and the synchronous MCS procedure to
update the strategies of players. Except for the difference that, the simulation results
shown below are required up to 3×104 generations and then sampled by another 103
generations to make sure that the evolution of cooperation approaches an evolutionary
stable state. The results of fractions of cooperators are also averaged over 50 different
realizations of initial conditions.
Similarly, we first show the evolution of the cooperative behaviours of the whole
population as a function of η with different pgr in Figure 3 to study the effect of global
redistribution of income on the evolution of cooperation in spatial PGG. It is well known
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Figure 3. The evolution of cooperation in spatial PGG with global redistribution of
income as a function of η with different values of pgr.
that the goal of income redistribution is not to make all incomes equal by taking money
away from some people and giving it to others in the whole population. Instead, it is
to avoid what proponents view as extreme or unreasonable inequality. Thus, the case
of pgr = 1.0 is beyond the scope of our work. Completely different from the previous
results in Figure 1, the evolution of cooperation decreases with increasing pgr in the
intermediate region of η as shown in Figure 3. As we show above, the mechanism of
local redistribution of income enhances the group heterogeneity on the square lattice
and boosts the evolution of cooperation in spatial PGG. While under the mechanism of
global redistribution of income, we assume that the total payoff of each defector after
G PGGs is Πgd, the total payoff of each cooperator is Πgc. Hence, the rest income of
each defector after paying part of their income to the population according to the given
probability pgr is Π
′
gd = Πgd · (1− pgr), and Π
′
gc = Πgc · (1− pgr) the rest income of each
cooperator. Then, the accumulated income is redistributed to the whole population
irrespective of their strategies and contributions. Accordingly, the final payoff of each
defector is Π′′gd = Π
′
gd + SgG/(L×L), and Π
′′
gc = Π
′
gc + SgG/(L×L) the final payoff
of each cooperator. Consequently, the payoff difference between a cooperator and a
defector is Π′′gd − Π
′′
gc = Π
′
gd − Π
′
gc = (Πgd − Πgc) · (1− pgr). Thus, the payoff difference
between cooperators and defectors is not only determined by 1 − pgr, but also the
difference between Πgd and Πgc. With Πgd − Πgc remaining unchanged, 1 − pgr helps
to reduce the heterogeneity between cooperators and defectors of the whole population
during the evolutionary process, which makes the inner incentive of players studying a
random neighbour performing better decline. Consequently, the evolutionary advantage
of compact cooperative clusters cannot spread to the whole population. Thus, the global
redistribution of income actually inhibit the evolution of cooperation for the better.
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Figure 4. Time evolution as characterized by the frequency of cooperators with
different pgr. Initially, cooperators and defectors are randomly distributed on the
square lattice with equal probability. The results are shown for η = 0.9. The
evolutionary processes are averaged over 1000 different initial conditions.
We also present the time evolution of cooperation in Figure 4 to study the effect
of the global redistribution of income intuitively. We clearly demonstrate that the
evolutionary dynamics of cooperation is fatigue with increasing pgr. Comparing with
Figure 2 in the initial stage, the increment of pgr eases the fall of cooperation to some
extent by narrowing the income gap between cooperators and defectors. While in the
long run, the mechanism of global redistribution of income reduces the heterogeneity
between players resulting in the declination of cooperation level in the evolutionary
steady state. That is, the payoff diversity of players is gone. Thereby, with high pgr,
players in the whole population have to pay more income to the whole population under
this system except for the contribution to the common pool. This makes people lose the
motivation of pursuing a better life which should be the driving force of social progress.
In other words, there are more and more free-riders. However, the mechanism of global
redistribution of income do exist in real social-economic system, such as individual
income tax.
In the following, we show Figure 5 and deeply investigate the effect of global
redistribution of income on the evolution of cooperation. As is shown in Figure 5,
the evolution of cooperation declines with increasing pgr on each fixed η , which is
consistent with Figure 4. Remarkably, for each fixed η, the frequency of cooperation
first declines slowly and then drops rapidly. It is noted that the inflection point of a
smooth curve is usually the maximum curvature point. To point out the critical point
of rapid decline for the frequency of cooperation, we calculate the maximum curvature
of the frequency of cooperation for each fixed η, where the full cooperation and zero
cooperation points are discarded. It is found that there exists an intermediate maximum
curvature point of pgr on each smooth curve with different η, which are marked as
green dots in Figure 5. For each fixed η, when pgr is smaller than the corresponding
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Figure 5. The evolution of cooperation in spatial PGG with global redistribution of
income as a function of pgr with different values of η. Green dots present the critical
points of rapid decline for the frequency of cooperation on ηs.
critical point, the cooperation level declines slowly. While over the critical point of
pgr, the cooperation level plummets. This phenomenon means that, on one hand, the
mechanism of global redistribution of income reduces income inequality within the whole
population, which is generally regarded to be a positive improvement to society. But
on the other hand, it may negatively affect the efficiency of social-economic system.
Thereby, the income expenditure proportion should be limited, which can be described
as the social tolerance. Beyond these limits, the social-economic system may be on
the brink of collapse. We argue that the stability of society is fundamental for the
evolution of cooperation in social systems, which is essentially different from the models
in biological systems[34, 35]. In addition, we note that the critical points are closely
related to η.
Social productivity affects the pre-tax income of players fundamentally[36]. In
this work, we assume that the renormalized enhancement factor η denotes the social
productivity. In order to investigate the corresponding relationship between η and
pgr intuitively, we plot Figure 6 to further study the effect of global redistribution of
income on the evolution of cooperation. Remarkably, there exists positive correlation
between social tolerance and social productivity as shown in Figure 6. With lower
social productivity, where η → 0.8, lower income expenditure proportion is needed to
rehabilitate the vulnerable cooperative behaviours. While, when η → 1.1, the limited
higher income expenditure proportion should be applied. However, combining Figure 5
where η > 0.95, we point out that, once beyond the limit of critical point of pgr, the
social cooperation collapses more quickly with higher η. On another level, when the
social development is uneven, the progressive tax structure is necessary. Low income
people might prefer lower tax rates to reserve enough money for basic living. People who
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Figure 6. The corresponding relationship between η and pgr in the evolution of
cooperation with global redistribution of income.
make more money might pay higher taxes under this system to reduce social inequalities.
And, the result shown in Figure 6 matches perfectly the property of tax progressivity[37].
This is the effectiveness and meaning of the redistribution of income.
4. Conclusion and discussion
In sum, we have studied the effects of redistribution of income on the evolution
of cooperation in a spatial PGG. Our research shows that local redistribution of
income promotes cooperative behaviours, while global redistribution of income inhibits
cooperation. In the context of local income redistribution, income differences between
cooperators and defectors in the same group are significantly influenced by parameter
plr. A group including more cooperators might be more successful in the evolution of
cooperation[38]. Although, group interactions may be less susceptible to the prevalence
of cooperation owing to strong heterogeneity in the spatial public goods game[39].
The mechanism of local income redistribution increases the possibilities of players
learning from the members in cooperative groups, where the concept of group selection
is continued. While in the model of global income redistribution, payoff differences
between players are eliminated with increasing pgr. The tendency of cooperation
evolution is weakened by the reduction of payoff heterogeneity in the whole population.
Furthermore, there exist intermediate critical points of income expenditure proportion
which indicate when social cooperation is maintained for different values of η. It is
also revealed that income expenditure proportion is positively associated with social
productivity. This highlights the subtle balance between social tolerance and social
productivity. That is, low social productivity restricts the efficient income expenditure
proportion which retains sufficient income for the living of common people. On the other
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hand, when social productivity is high, the limited higher income expenditure proportion
can be applied to reduce social inequalities. The right balance between them is subtle
and difficult to pinpoint, which is associated with the specific social environment. A
qualitative analysis is provided in this work corresponding to the public goods dilemma.
Previous works on PGG have proposed a few mechanisms to boom cooperation.
Some literatures focused on the players’ cognition of each other[40]. Szabo´ and Szolnoki
studied myopic players whose payoff interest is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding
preference via fraternity adopting utility function[41]. They found that the highest total
income is achieved by the society whose members share their income fraternally. Grund
et al distinguished between the evolution of individual preferences and behaviours by
investigating self-regarding and other-regarding types of humans from an over-arching
theoretical perspective to overcome the historical controversy in the behavioural sciences
between largely incompatible views about human nature[42]. They demonstrated that a
few “idealists” trigger off cooperation cascades, which can largely accelerate the spread
of cooperation. The above results are intriguing, but they suffer from a serious practical
problem in social-economic system. Actually, neither laying hopes on a few “idealists”
nor over idealizing rock-solid brotherhood is practical. In this paper, we continue along
the concept of “rational-economic man”, who makes decisions without considering the
payoff or utility of others and the second-payment is mandatory. Without endowing
players with special characters, the effects of redistribution of income bring us lots of
inspiration to the evolution of cooperation in real social-economic systems.
Some of former researches have studied how the presence of relatedness, which is
incorporated into the game dynamics by redistributing a proportion of the payoffs to
their immediate neighbours, affects the evolution of cooperation in the framework of
the prisoner’s dilemma game and the snowdrift game[43]. They found that the larger
the proportion of the ultimate payoffs is contributed by the neighbouring individuals,
the more easily the cooperation can be established and persist in the population. They
argued that their work did not need an extra personal feature to characterize the other-
regarding preference of the individuals, and players make decisions without considering
the payoff or utility of others. Compared with these, our work provides a more
profound understanding. We have compared the characteristics on local redistribution
of income and global redistribution of income, and studied their effects on the evolution
of cooperation in spatial PGG. We consider the real issues in a situation of “networked
minds”, which could significantly contribute to the converge of the behavioural sciences,
and create a fundamentally new understanding of social-economic system. With such
simple and fundamental model, we could make more attempts to highlight the way to
exploring the effects of social mechanisms on the evolution of cooperation in real society.
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